On mission of da'wah in accordance with Islamic ethics in Malaysia.

To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. In this book, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort - "objective reasons" - to perform some act unless one has free will regarding that act.

Introduction: The metaphysics of responsibility and philosophy of education -- Moral responsibility, authenticity, and the problem of manipulation -- A novel perspective on the problem of authenticity -- Forward-looking authenticity in the internalism/externalism debate -- Authentic education, indoctrination, and moral responsibility -- Moral responsibility, hard incompatibilism, and interpersonal relationships -- On the significance of moral responsibility and love -- Love, commendability, and moral obligation -- Love, determinism, and normative education.

A Common Word Between Us and You is an open letter, dated 13 October 2007, from leaders of the Islamic religion to those of the Christian religion. It calls for peace between Muslims and Christians and seeks common ground and understanding between both religions. This volume examines the document from a number of perspectives. Exploring the events that led to ACW, it provides an overview of responses to the document and its use of scripture. It also relates the reception of (...) ACW to several specific and contrasting contexts, and recommends new avenues for ACW-inspired discussion. Advancing debate and dialogue between Jews, Muslims and Christians, this volume promotes a distinctive methodology for inter-religious studies, and serves as an invaluable resource for students and scholars of theology and religious studies. (shrink)

The role of freedom in assigning moral responsibility is one of the deepest problems in metaphysics and moral theory. _Incompatibilism’s Allure_ provides original analysis of the principal arguments for incompatibilism. Ishtiyaque Haji incisively examines the consequence argument, the direct argument, the deontic argument, the manipulation argument, the impossibility argument and the luck objection. He introduces the most important contemporary discussions in a manner accessible to advanced undergraduates, but also suited to professional philosophers. The result is a unique and compelling (...) account for incompatibilism’s continuing allure. (shrink)

Something is subject to luck if it is beyond our control. In Luck's Mischief, Haji argues that owing frequently to precluding our being able to otherwise, luck limits both the range of what is morally obligatory for us and things for which we are morally responsible.

This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma (...) can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified. (shrink)

John Lemos defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will that is a variant of event-causal libertarian views. Many argue that these views are susceptible to the luck problem: an agent’s directly free choices are too luck infected for the agent to be morally responsible for them. The weightings model supposedly escapes this problem largely because in this model an agent’s reasons for choices do not come with pre-established values. Rather, an agent performs intentional acts of weighting that contribute (...) to the value she assigns to her reasons. Decisions that are consequences of weightings are, thus, under the agent’s control and not subject to luck. In a recent paper, I argued that despite its weighting component, Lemos’s model succumbs to the luck problem. Lemos rejoins that my criticisms are based on misunderstandings and confusions. I deflect the charge of misperception and explain why the weightings model remains susceptible to the luck problem. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article porte sur l’analyse des interrelations entre les pratiques non officielles du sulh, de la réconciliation, et le travail des cours de justice à partir d’enquêtes menées en Algérie et, subsidiairement, au Soudan. J’illustrerai en particulier l’idée que le sulh – action faisant bien souvent référence au ‘ûrf (conventions usuelles ou droit coutumier) ou encore à la loi coranique et aux jurisprudences musulmanes (malékite en particulier) – s’inscrit en continuité et en complément avec le travail judiciaire. Je propose (...) ici de réfléchir à la pluralité des acteurs, mais également aux dimensions spatiales et temporelles qui orientent l’ensemble du processus articulant pratiques non officielles de réconciliation et celles (officielles) des cours de justice. Nous avons en effet une pluralité de lieux – lieu du crime, lieux de la réconciliation, cours de justice – qui imprègnent et l’interprétation que l’on se fait de l’offense et le procès socio-légal (réconciliation/cours de justice) dans son ensemble. Je discuterai ainsi des conséquences pratiques et théoriques de cette articulation entre réconciliation (sulh) et processus judiciaire. (shrink)

Recently, Neil Levy has proposed that an agent can acquire freedom‐relevant agential abilities by virtue of the conditions in which she finds herself, and in this way, can be thought of as partially constituted by those conditions. This can be so even if the agent is completely ignorant of the relevant environmental conditions, and even if these conditions play no causal role in what the agent does. Drawing upon these resources, Levy argues that Frankfurt‐style examples are not cogent. In this (...) paper, we explain why his argument fails. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 4, Page 799-811, August 2022.

An agent who is the victim of covert and nonconstraining control is unaware of being controlled and controllers get their way by manipulating the victims so that they willingly do what the controllers desire. Our primary objective is to argue that if cases of CNC manipulation undermine compatibilist accounts of the sort of control required for moral responsibility, they also undermine various agent‐causal and non‐agent‐causal libertarian accounts as well.

Determinism is, roughly, the thesis that facts about the past and the laws of nature entail all truths. A venerable, age-old dilemma concerning responsibility distils to this: if either determinism is true or it is not true, we lack "responsibility-grounding" control. Either determinism is true or it is not true. So, we lack responsibility-grounding control. Deprived of such control, no one is ever morally responsible for anything. A number of the freshly-minted essays in this collection address aspects of this dilemma. (...) Responding to the horn that determinism undermines the freedom that responsibility (or moral obligation) requires, the freedom to do otherwise, some papers in this collection debate the merits of Frankfurt-style examples that purport to show that one can be responsible despite lacking alternatives. Responding to the horn that indeterminism implies luck or randomness, other papers discuss the strengths or shortcomings of libertarian free will or control. Also included in this collection are essays on the freedom requirements of moral obligation, forgiveness and free will, a "desert-free" conception of free will, and vicarious legal and moral responsibility. The authors of the essays in this volume are philosophers who have made significant contributions to debates in free will, moral responsibility, moral obligation, the reactive attitudes, philosophy of action, and philosophical psychology, and include John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Michael McKenna, Alfred Mele, and Derk Pereboom. (shrink)

In this engaging, highly instructive, well-written, and carefully constructed work, Bernstein inquires into the qualities that confer moral patienthood on an individual. To be a moral patient is to be an individual deserving of moral consideration ; and to be so deserving requires that the individual have a “welfare” in that it must be capable of being made better or worse off. An individual qualifies as a moral patient if and only if it has a welfare. In the first part (...) of the two-part book, Bernstein discusses three theories of personal welfare—three ways of conceiving how individuals can be made better or worse off—that yield three different conceptions of moral patienthood. (shrink)

This book explores the epistemic or knowledge requirement of moral responsibility. Haji argues that an agent can be blamed (or praised) only if the agent harbors a belief that the action in question is wrong (or right or obligatory). Defending the importance of an "authenticity" condition when evaluating moral responsibility, Haji holds that one cannot be morally responsible for an action unless the action issues from sources (like desires or beliefs) that are truly the agent's own. Engaging crucial (...) arguments in moral theory to elaborate his views on moral responsibility, Haji addresses as well fascinating, underexamined topics such as assigning blame across an intercultural gap and the relevance of unconscious or dream thoughts when evaluating responsibility. (shrink)

An ideal of education is to ensure that our children develop into autonomous critical thinkers. The ‘indoctrination objection’, however, calls into question whether education, aimed at cultivating autonomous critical thinkers, is possible. The core of the concern is that since the young child lacks even modest capacities for assessing reasons, the constituent components of critical thinking have to be indoctrinated if there is to be any hope of the child's attaining the ideal. Our primary objective is to defuse this objection. (...) We argue, first, that even if the indoctrination objection can be dealt with at the level of beliefs by an account that distinguishes between beliefs instilled in the child at the non‐rational stage that are indoctrinative and those that are non‐indoctrinative, there can be non‐autonomous ‘proto critical thinkers’ who lack autonomy with respect to the requisite motivational components. We then ask what must be added to the account to ensure that proto critical thinkers develop into autonomous ones. We suggest that motivational elements, even if instilled at a stage at which the child has insufficiently developed cognitive capacities, can be ‘truly the child's own’ only relationally: the autonomous motivational elements are ones with respect to which the future child is self‐governing. (shrink)

An ideal of education is to ensure that our children develop into autonomous critical thinkers. The ‘indoctrination objection’, however, calls into question whether education, aimed at cultivating autonomous critical thinkers, is possible. The core of the concern is that since the young child lacks even modest capacities for assessing reasons, the constituent components of critical thinking have to be indoctrinated if there is to be any hope of the child's attaining the ideal. Our primary objective is to defuse this objection. (...) We argue, first, that even if the indoctrination objection can be dealt with at the level of beliefs by an account that distinguishes between beliefs instilled in the child at the non‐rational stage that are indoctrinative and those that are non‐indoctrinative, there can be non‐autonomous ‘proto critical thinkers’ who lack autonomy with respect to the requisite motivational components. We then ask what must be added to the account to ensure that proto critical thinkers develop into autonomous ones. We suggest that motivational elements, even if instilled at a stage at which the child has insufficiently developed cognitive capacities, can be ‘truly the child's own’ only relationally: the autonomous motivational elements are ones with respect to which the future child is self‐governing. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article porte sur l’analyse des interrelations entre les pratiques non officielles du sulh, de la réconciliation, et le travail des cours de justice à partir d’enquêtes menées en Algérie et, subsidiairement, au Soudan. J’illustrerai en particulier l’idée que le sulh – action faisant bien souvent référence au ‘ûrf (conventions usuelles ou droit coutumier) ou encore à la loi coranique et aux jurisprudences musulmanes (malékite en particulier) – s’inscrit en continuité et en complément avec le travail judiciaire. Je propose (...) ici de réfléchir à la pluralité des acteurs, mais également aux dimensions spatiales et temporelles qui orientent l’ensemble du processus articulant pratiques non officielles de réconciliation et celles (officielles) des cours de justice. Nous avons en effet une pluralité de lieux – lieu du crime, lieux de la réconciliation, cours de justice – qui imprègnent et l’interprétation que l’on se fait de l’offense et le procès socio-légal (réconciliation/cours de justice) dans son ensemble. Je discuterai ainsi des conséquences pratiques et théoriques de cette articulation entre réconciliation (sulh) et processus judiciaire. (shrink)

The principle of alternate possibilities says that you are morally praiseworthy or blameworthy for something you do only if you could have done otherwise. Frankfurt examples are putative counterexamples to PAP. These examples feature a failsafe mechanism that ensures that some agent cannot refrain from doing what she does without intervening in how she conducts herself, thereby supposedly sustaining the upshot that she is responsible for her behavior despite not being able to do otherwise. I introduce a Frankfurt example in (...) which the agent who could not have done otherwise is God. Paying attention to the freedom requirements of moral obligation, the example is commissioned, first, to assess whether various statesof affairs that are unavoidable for God can be obligatory for God and for whichGod can be praiseworthy. The example is, next, used to unearth problems with conventional Frankfurt examples that feature human agents. I argue that conceptual connections between responsibility and obligation cast suspicion on these examples. Pertinent lessons that the divine Frankfurt example helps to reveal motivate the view that divine foreknowledge and determinism, assuming that both preclude freedom to do otherwise, may well imperil obligation and responsibility. (shrink)

Semi-compatibilism regarding responsibility is the position according to which determinism is compatible with moral responsibility quite apart from whether determinism rules out the sort of freedom that involves access to alternative possibilities. I motivate the view that whether or not semi-compat..

In chapter 2, Myers introduces the conception of morality as a cooperative undertaking to promote the overall good on terms fair to everyone involved. Fair promotion of the overall good, he argues, requires impartial beneficence to be restrained by prerogatives and restrictions. The rationale for prerogatives turns, ultimately, on the premise that promoting the overall good fairly must account for the fact that we inevitably have values other than our concern for impartial beneficence. It would be unfair, because too demanding, (...) to require people fully to subordinate these competing values to their goal of promoting overall goodness. For “acting in ways that are true to all one’s values is an important ideal of individual behaviour” and so must be given some play. Fairness, then, requires balancing one’s concern to promote the overall good with one’s concern to be faithful to the other values that apply to one. Myers favors a “no-harm” version of prerogatives that allows people to give their own interests and desires a disproportionate weight only in cases where advancing their own ends would prevent them from giving aid to others. (shrink)

abstract An appeal to children's authenticity is widespread in major debates in the philosophy of education. However, no evident uniform conception of authenticity informs the dialectic. We begin with examples that confirm this multiplicity. We then uncover a common strand that unifies these seemingly differing conceptions: authenticity is exemplified by motivational elements, such as the agent's desires, when these elements are, in a manner to be explicated, ‘truly the agent's own’. It is this view of authenticity that is the mainstay (...) of a predicament in the philosophy of education: if education entails intentional instilment of certain motivational elements in the child but such intentional moulding, in the absence of the agent's consent, is generally incompatible with authenticity, how is an authentic education possible? We respond by developing a relational account of authenticity that denies that motivational elements are authentic in their own right; they are authentic only relative to ensuring certain ends. (shrink)

The study aims through a deductively descriptive method to focuson the influence of Arabic on the Malaysian culture. The most importantmilestones of Arabic in the Malaysian context and the most stand out Malaysiapublic and private institutions which made the most contributions in spreadingArabic in the Malay culture. The study begins with the arrival of Islam andArabic in the Archipelago as a precursor to uncover the depth of the influenceof Arabic in the minds and culture of the Malays. The influence of (...) Arabic onthe following aspects will also be discussed: the writing script of the Malay,the educational system in schools and universities, the mass media in additionto the public. (shrink)

In their paper ‘Designing AI for mental health diagnosis: challenges from sub-Saharan African value-laden judgements on mental health disorders’, Ugar and Malele focused on the challenges and considerations surrounding the design and implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) technologies for diagnosing mental health disorders in South Africa. Although the authors recognise the application of AI and ML in healthcare, they put forward the challenges, particularly in adopting Wakefield’s hybrid theory, where elements of naturalism and normativism are combined (...) in defining mental disorders. They argue that a generic or universally designed AI or ML would not be appropriate in countries with strong and varied local contexts. Hence, they believe that current and future AI developers should consider the cultural nuances, value systems and contextual factors in designing and implementing AI technologies for mental health diagnosis in Africa. When the authors argue that a universal definition of mental health may not be appropriate in Africa, we would like to offer something in contrast. If nomenclature like the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) can be widely accepted, why does AI, which relies on these codes, encounter scepticism? Recognising the significant influence of culture on all aspects of patient care in psychiatry, the DSM-IV introduced the …. (shrink)

Externalism is the view that facts about one's history or past in the external world that bear on the acquisition of one's responsibility-grounding psychological elements are pertinent to whether one's actions are free and, hence, pertinent to whether one can be morally responsible for them. Internalism is the thesis that the conditions of moral responsibility can be specified independently of facts about how the person acquired her responsibility-grounding psychological elements. In this paper we defend a position that navigates between externalism (...) and internalism: moral responsibility does not require that one have a past but it does require that one not have certain kinds of past. (shrink)

It has been argued that all compatibilist accounts of free action and moral responsibility succumb to the manipulation problem: evil neurologists or their like may manipulate an agent, in the absence of the agent's awareness of being so manipulated, so that when the agent performs an action, requirements of the compatibilist contender at issue are satisfied. But intuitively, the agent is not responsible for the action. We propose that the manipulation problem be construed as a problem of deviance. In troubling (...) cases of manipulation, psychological elements such as desires and beliefs, among other things, are acquired via causal routes that are deviant relative to causal routes deemed normal or baseline. We develop and defend rudiments of a baseline that is acceptable independently of whether one has compatibilist or incompatibilist leanings. (shrink)

There are no moral obligations: either it is determined in advance what we will do, or it is not. But any action not in our control cannot be obligatory for us. Hence, regardless of whether our actions are determined to occur, nothing is obligatory. This conclusion has important implications for conceptions of moral responsibility and free will.

This paper is an illustration of the case study of trying to create an awareness of human values at the Malaysian Airlines System (MAS) as part of its work culture. Some of the principles of this intervention and the key process used in developing a values-based culture are highlighted. A brief background of why MAS undertook a values journey is given along with the approach and the process used, based on the values clarification process (VCP). The development of other internal (...) processes customized to design in-house modules through the values awareness programme (VAP) and the values inculcation programme (VIP) are also outlined. The paper combines two perspectives in this case study: one of the authors was an internal consultant with MAS and the other an external consultant to parts of the process. The objective is to share insights from such an intervention to enable other organizations to benefit from this experience. (shrink)

The author first argues against the view that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if it is morally wrong for that agent to perform that action. The author then proposes a replacement for this view whose gist is summarized in the principle: an agent S is morally blameworthy for performing action A only if S has the belief that it is wrong for her to do A and this belief plays an appropriate role in S’s Aing. (...) He focuses on explicating the role an agent’s belief that a prospective action, A, of hers is wrong must play in the production of her A-ing in order that she be blameworthy for A-ing. Towards this end, the author makes use of cases involving akrasia and self-deception. (shrink)

I assess Robert Kane's view that global Frankfurt-type cases don't show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kane's indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kane's notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt-type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agent's actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing (...) to considerations of responsibility and luck, I then show that the global cases survive Kane's objections. (shrink)